

The Ethics of the Drink Question

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OF all men, it behooves the temperance advocate to be temperate in his advocacy, for he is aiming at interfering to some extent with personal liberty and at restraining pleasurable indulgence. Accordingly unless his arguments are thoroughly sound, his facts certain, his inferences logical, and unless necessity and expediency, precept and counsel are kept perfectly distinct in his recommendations, the flaws in his reasoning will reflect discredit on his cause itself, and give men a ready excuse for turning deaf ears to his pleading. To try to impose a yoke for which there is no warrant, naturally disposes the victim to discard the yoke which should be borne. Hence the great advantage which the Catholic reformer has in the fact that the moral principles which he invokes are drawn from the tried and traditional teaching of the Church and are both definite and well established. Hence too the caution which the Church exercises in regard to the individual cooperation of her children with temperance work, based on principles which she cannot admit or excluding those which are most fundamental and important. She has expressly prohibited Catholics joining the "Sons of Temperance" in the United States and the "Good Templars," "Rechabites" and similar societies in the British Isles, because she cannot wholly approve of the motives of these zealous reformers nor has she any guarantee of the soundness of their methods. And even when the Temperance cause is dissociated from any specifically religious propaganda, this does not make it altogether unobjectionable from the Catholic point of view. For in such a case the merely natural virtue of temperance is thrust up into an unnatural prominence and its cultivation tends to be made a religion, either of itself or in combination with those other bugbears of ultra-Puritanism, betting, smoking,

card-playing and theater-going. Accordingly it may be useful to state formally in this chapter the main lines of Catholic teaching on temperance.

DOCTRINE ABOUT ALCOHOL

Naturally we take first the subject of alcohol itself. What does the Church teach about that? The Church lends no countenance to the idea that alcohol is anything evil *in se*. Nothing that God has created is or can be evil *in se*, however much it may be abused. Of all that He made it is written, "He saw that it was good." The Manicheans asserted a dual origin of material things—a good and an evil principle—and their heresy is revived by those temperance bodies who hold, as some apparently do, that alcohol is intrinsically an evil thing, or so inevitably bound up with evil that they cannot practically be dissociated. If that were the case it would be easier, no doubt, to urge its abandonment; one's plea could then be based strongly upon conscience and the moral law; but the Christian's is the harder task of discriminating between use and abuse, of enforcing law without unduly infringing liberty. So Catholic advocacy of temperance is never disfigured by this false plea. Alcohol has its lawful place in the scheme of things and its claims however limited must be recognized. "Drink," says Father Bridgett, "is the work of God, drunkenness is the work of man."

HERESIES ON THE SUBJECT

Heresy on the matter of strong drink made its appearance very early in the history of Christianity, being one phase of that strange medley of errors concerning the body and its functions taught by the early Gnostics. Tatian (*d.* 174) founded a sect called the Aquarians who would not use wine even in the celebration of the Eucharist. St. Clement of Alexandria had expressly to prove that this view was contrary to the teaching and practice of Our Lord and the Apostles, as recorded in the New Testament. The heretic as we know, from Judaizer to Jansenist, has ever been prone to concentrate his attention on external observance, whilst allowing his spirit all the more freedom from control. St. Augustine had to wage war on the Manicheans and, when in the twelfth century, the Albigenses revived that old misbelief, they

found a vigorous opponent in St. Bernard. "They are heretics," he said, "not because they abstain, but because they abstain heretically." And finally, not to multiply authorities in a matter which is beyond dispute, Cardinal Manning, in an address delivered in 1872, emphasized the common teaching as follows:

I repeat distinctly that any man who should say that the use of wine or any other like thing is sinful when it does not lead to drunkenness, that man is a heretic condemned by the Catholic Church. With that man I will never work.

It is a singular thing that, whereas the false prophet Mahomet elevated abstinence from strong drink into a necessary condition for salvation, none of the many varieties of ascetic rule in the Catholic Church has recommended it explicitly even as a counsel.

THE CATHOLIC TEACHING ON DRUNKENNESS

But whilst guarding with extreme care against Manicheism, which in effect denies the existence of God, the Church has been equally alive to the necessity of condemning all abuse of intoxicants. She teaches that complete drunkenness is as such a mortal sin, one of the deadly seven. The reason is this: God has endowed man with intellect to be the guide of his conduct; it is unlawful, therefore, for him to withdraw from that guidance by such over-indulgence in drink as results in the temporary loss of reason and reduces him to the level of the beasts or below it. He is evading his responsibilities as a servant of his Creator. Temporary deprivation of consciousness, of course, is not at all the same thing. By the natural process of sleep we become actually unconscious, but we can be recalled to the use of reason in a moment: the faculty remains potentially operative. Besides which, sleep normally puts an end to all our other activities as well; we are no longer capable of acting even irrationally. And the same thing may be said of the anesthetics used in medical science, the primary effect of which, besides, is to suspend sensation and thus avert shock, but which have also the concomitant effect of suspending consciousness. On the other hand since there are many stages in formal drunkenness before the sleep of stupor is reached, the drunkard, whilst lost to the control of reason, is still able to carry out the promptings of his lower appetites. If, therefore, a person

consciously and willingly drinks to excess, so that he is no longer capable of distinguishing between good and evil, he sins grievously, even though his incapacity does not lead him into further wrong-doing. Moreover, he is accountable for any evil he may foresee that he will do in that state. Even the civil law holds him responsible for his conduct—nay, even more so—unless indeed he can prove he became drunk accidentally. "As for a drunkard, who is a *voluntarius demon*, he hath no privilege thereby: but what hurt or ill soever he doeth, his drunkenness doth aggravate it. ("*Coke on Lyttleton*," 247a.)

THE MORAL MEASURE OF EXCESS IN DRINK

According to the degree of deprivation of reason is the gravity of alcoholic excess measured. But there are also a number of other offenses almost inseparably connected with this excess which serve to determine and increase its guilt. As reason is the instrument by which we recognize the presence of temptation and our obligation to shun it, any interference with the working of this instrument puts us in some danger of sin. Again, although anything short of complete drunkenness as defined cannot in itself be grievously sinful, still excess is always sinful to some extent, and it may be gravely wrong in its consequences. These accidental effects of whole or partial intoxication arise from our life in community, i.e., from a man's position amongst his fellows which cannot but entail a number of duties of justice and charity in their regard. Justice, for instance, demands that he should not defraud, by his devotion to drink, those dependent on him, or those that employ him, of their due. Moreover, a man's circumstances may be such—his income so small, his health so precarious, his time so much occupied, his official character so dignified—that what would be moderate expenditure of time and money and physical well-being in another, would be excessive in him. Therefore it does not always require technical inebriation to constitute a serious fault.

To exceed in drink is, therefore, to take more than is good for one. What is good for one is settled by reference to many considerations. For instance, drink is not

good for one *morally* if it commonly leads one into sin, whether of itself by the want of control it induces or accidentally by causing one to associate with bad characters, or even to waste time, to give scandal or to omit religious duties. Nor is it *morally* or *financially* good for one, if it leads to spending, even in small quantities, what is not one's own but due in some way to tradesfolk or dependents. Nor is it *physically* good for one, if it causes a notable and permanent diminution of health. Even, therefore, if a man remains well within the medical definition of excess, and consumes no more than an ounce of alcohol in the day, he may easily exceed in a variety of other ways, and sin through indulgence in drink. He may sin, too, however little he drinks himself, by spending what he should not spend in treating others and perhaps doing harm to them, or by challenging or encouraging others to drink to their own detriment in one or other of the above ways, or by disedifying the young and causing scandal generally on account of his age or position. And all this applies with at least equal force to women, in whom intemperance of any sort is especially loathsome because of the greater refinement and spirituality of their sex.

Now, considering the individual apart from his family and social relations it may be useful to inquire to what extent he is bound to regard his own bodily health in this matter. If his quickness of brain or skill of hand, on the strength of which assets he gains his salary, is impaired by even moderate drinking, then obviously he is doing injustice to those who employ him. But, apart from external obligations, is the injury to health, asserted with such weight of medical evidence to follow moderate indulgence in strong drink, a sin against that proper self-regard which our Maker expects us to have concerning the bodies He has lent to us?

THE CLAIMS OF WELL-BEING

Bodily health, being a good in the natural order, is consequently not the chief good of life. Taking for granted that, whatever be the benefits of strong drink in certain diseases no healthy person really suffers in health on account of abstinence, we infer that, for such persons it is in no sense a necessity or even a conven-

ience, but rather partakes of the character of a luxury. Moreover, in the case of very many, it is a luxury which does actual physical harm, greater or less and more or less permanent, according to the strength of the constitution affected. The ethical point is—is a person justified in seeking the pleasure, physical and psychical, which strong drink affords even though it injures, at least to some slight extent, his bodily health? As this question enters very fundamentally into the whole drink problem, it will be necessary to consider it pretty thoroughly. In what circumstances and to what extent is a person justified for the sake of some other honest end, in impairing his physical well-being?

It is plain that the interests of the soul come before those of the body. If therefore a course of action which benefits the soul, rendering the will stronger against temptation and more amenable to God's law, is found also to damage in some degree the body, that disadvantage may be disregarded in view of the higher good. This is a common-sense principle which comes to us recommended by the teaching of the Gospel and by the uniform practice of the Saints, some of whom for their better spiritual development maltreated their bodies in extraordinary ways, and all of whom to some extent employed what goes by the significant name of corporal mortification. This Christian asceticism has a good object—the bringing of the body into subjection to the spirit or the desire to imitate and share the atoning sufferings of Christ—and must on no account be confounded with the practice of some early heretics who mutilated themselves so as to get rid of fleshly temptations, or of those devotees of false religions who undergo hideous self-tortures by way of propitiating an evil deity who is supposed to delight in the spectacle of human suffering. There is nothing morbid about true asceticism: it is always regulated by prudence, always supposes a careful consideration of one's obligations and is never an end in itself.

Its lawfulness will be the more apparent if we consider how readily, in pursuit of merely temporal ends, men expose their bodily health to injury. We may safely say that heaping up treasures on earth has done much more to impair human vitality than heaping up treasures in

heaven. What reckless expenditure of health and even life has marked the extension of trade and the pursuit of gold throughout the world. And not only the pursuit of wealth, but even the search for a livelihood induces men to undertake tasks which cannot but injure their health. There are dangerous trades like mining and unhealthy trades like file-making, to engage in which many are persuaded by the pressure of necessity or the high rate of wages. Men have always thought that it is better to live with less strength and vigor than not to live at all. Bodily well-being, in fact, though a great good, is freely and lawfully neglected in view of goods which are considered to be higher. There are many other such goods besides those we have mentioned. Consider how health is sacrificed to advance the cause of science and extend the sphere of knowledge, either by exploring the unhealthy regions of the tropics or the poles, or by investigating the cause of disease. Experimenting with the X-rays, for instance, cost a brave doctor his arm. We may class, too, amongst the victims of science those many pioneers in the art of aviation who have perished in testing various new mechanical devices and conditions. And of course the performance of their duty often demands disregard of health, and sometimes even of life, in the case of public servants—priests, soldiers and sailors, police, firemen, nurses too, and doctors. Still more to the point—in pursuit of many forms of bodily enjoyment—hunting, climbing, wild-game shooting, football, sport in general—all sorts of damage to health are occasioned or risked, yet so long as devotion to these pursuits does not cause us to neglect our duties, whether to God or man, who will say that the preference of such pleasure to health is in itself sinful? It may often be folly, a sacrifice of the future to the present: but then, not all folly is sin, though all sin is folly.

CAN DRINKING BE INCLUDED IN THESE CASES?

So we cannot condemn any object of desire on the sole grounds that the pursuit of it injures health. It may, of course, be urged that the objects mentioned above—spiritual progress, material benefit, growth of knowledge, the public service, sport even—are all worthy objects, for the gaining of which it is not unfitting to pay the price

of a certain loss of health, whereas mere pleasure of the palate, such as caused by drink, does not in itself justify the sacrifice.* Nevertheless, this plea cannot be admitted without strict qualification. Pleasure is attached to the use of all our senses, and although their primary object is to place the soul in communication with the external world, still they may also be used with moderation for the sake of the pleasure of exercise. We may blamelessly delight our eyes with beautiful scenery or pictures, our ears with fine singing, our sense of smell with the perfumes of the flowers—why not our taste with strong drink? The truth is that where goods are of the same order and there is thus some sort of proportion between them, where, moreover, no other considerations limit his choice, man is free to choose, free therefore to prefer the less good to the greater, the more immediate to the more remote. No doubt the range of choice is more limited in matters which concern the bodily appetites and the senses of touch and taste, ministering as they do to our lower nature and thus calling for greater restraint, but even there we must allow a certain degree of freedom. Consider the alternative. If we were morally bound to make health our first consideration in all matters of dietary—we should be ensnared in a legalism more stern than that of Leviticus, and every conscientious person would feel bound to acquire an unwholesome knowledge of alimentary processes! In this respect eating and drinking are on a level. Even though an individual may know that certain nice foods and drinks are not for him altogether healthy, he is not obliged under sin to abstain from them. He may lawfully choose the pleasure which comes from an actual moderate use of them, in spite of the future resultant physical discomfort. No one is bound under pain of moral fault to choose the most perfect of all courses open to him. In fact, it is precisely because eating and drinking cause physical pleasure, a pleasure which may be lawfully accepted if taken in moderation, that there is

*St. Augustine seems to hold that it is always sinful to gratify the senses of taste and touch unless with reference to the end for which pleasure was attached to their employment. But most modern moralists agree with St. Thomas that such gratification is lawful in itself, provided it is regulated by temperance.

in regard to it, at one and the same time, necessity for the virtue of temperance and scope for the virtue of abstinence.

THE CLAIMS OF HEALTH NOT TO BE EXAGGERATED

Consequently, we cannot rest our opposition to excessive drinking mainly on the grounds that alcohol is a poison and injurious to health. Even though the whole medical faculty were united in that opinion, man would not be morally bound to avoid strong drink. He is free to reckon the pleasure to the palate, the glow of the body, the exhilaration to the sentiments, the breaking down of reserve, the temporary stimulus to thought, the oblivion of care and trouble, which he has found to be its immediate effects, to be worth the diminution of health that is its consequence, supposing those ill results are slight or not permanent. We cannot say that strong drink in moderation is so manifestly injurious that a man fails in due self-regard by its use. The effects above mentioned are not wrong in themselves, and therefore they may be sought by means which are not wrong. Great harm has been done to the cause of temperance by the attempt to make all alcoholic drinking necessarily sinful and by exaggerating the obligation to avoid what is unhealthy. The attempt is foolish, for it goes against common-sense and common practice, sanctioned by many of the holiest of mankind. Total abstinence is not a *sine qua non* of perfection, nor necessarily a means to it.

We have labored this point somewhat, because the terrible nature of the evils caused by drink, and the zeal and earnestness with which the sight of those evils inspires them, are prone to make reformers turn to compulsion rather than to persuasion, and condemn those who do not wholly side with them. There is nothing in Catholicism that countenances this intransigent attitude. Appetite, in connection with eating and drinking, is designed to make us attend to the duty of promoting our physical development. Between eating and drinking to live, which is our bounden duty, and living to eat and drink, which is an abuse of a natural instinct, there is a fairly wide field which may be occupied without reproach. The enlightened temperance reformer has in present circumstances many reasons for abstinence to urge upon the "moderate" drinker, but he will never con-

demn him for using his liberty, unless there are other extrinsic considerations in the case, which make that use unlawful.

EXTRINSIC REASONS FOR ABSTINENCE

These considerations we have already touched upon. They concern our relations to God and to our neighbor. As the property of strong drink, even in small quantities, is to weaken the control of reason over appetite, it may be necessary for some men to abstain altogether if they are to avoid the occasions of sin. In other words, the epithet "moderate," employed in connection with indulgence in alcoholic drink, is strictly relative. As some bodily constitutions are capable of resisting or repairing its injurious effects with comparative ease, so some characters are so strongly grounded in good, have such confirmed habits of well-doing, that even in "moments of expansion" they oppose, as it were instinctively, the suggestions of evil. "Moderation" in regard to such characters, so far as the claims of conscience are concerned, obviously need not be pitched so low as in the case of those who are largely governed by impulse and prone to follow the line of least resistance. It is a matter of personal experience and for personal regulation. One's finances, one's family, one's physique, the peculiar character of one's work, the obligation of setting a good example—all these, as we have seen, are circumstances which operate to modify the extension of "moderation," and to enforce the necessity of making a careful determination as to what it means in one's own case. The technical definition of excess is the imbibing a greater quantity than the body can dispose of in twenty-four hours, viz., about one ounce of pure alcohol. Those who have ever given even a slight attention to the subject must be convinced that, judging by this standard, there is a very widespread abuse of strong drink in the world, and that many who consider themselves "moderate" in its use would stand convicted of excess in one or more of the above particulars if tried by an impartial tribunal.

But note that this is not the only case in which the moralist must cry out against vicious excess—would that it were so! Immense sums of money are wasted on other luxuries—such as fashion which ministers to vanity, tobacco which ministers often to mere self-indulgence,

betting and gambling which are largely influenced by avarice—and much preventable misery is caused by culpable ignorance and improvidence in the use of money. But none of these evils has such a hold upon its victims or causes such widespread individual, family and social evils as drinking to excess. Society can recover, as it were automatically, from the harm done by others: to oppose this, it must be organized, instructed, and inspired, or it stands in danger of perishing.

TOTAL ABSTINENCE NOT AN EXTREME

It will be gathered from what we have said that it is a mistake and a harmful one to regard total abstinence as one extreme and drunkenness as the other, whilst moderation occupies the golden and virtuous mean. Yet there is a speciousness about this assertion which no doubt has kept many from becoming teetotalers: no one likes to be labeled a fanatic. Yet, it is easy to show that, although temperance may be advocated fanatically, in itself it is not fanatical. The Aristotelian doctrine that virtue lies between two vicious extremes, one indicating defect, the other excess, of the quality constituting the virtue, has its roots in the fact that all virtues, except the Divine virtue of charity, are means to an end, and their pursuit must therefore be regulated by reference to that end. Too much of the quality overshoots, too little falls short of, the object desired, and accordingly both are vicious as failing to attain it. Now, we might deny altogether that this doctrine is applicable to the matter in hand, since drinking strong liquor for pleasure's sake cannot surely be reckoned a virtue, but, assuming that in the physical order it is not a bad thing as satisfying a bodily appetite, the "virtue" of the practice will consist in taking just so much drink as benefits the whole organism, whilst the vicious extremes are, respectively, taking too much or too little for that purpose. But, since it is practically certain that alcoholic drinks do not, in health at least, benefit the body at all, the "virtue" in this case surely lies in abstinence, and so even moderation, not merely drunkenness, becomes an extreme. That there is no negative extreme in this case, in other words that we cannot fail in our duty to our bodies by taking too little alcohol, simply shows that the

doctrine cannot really be applied. One might as well say that chastity is a vicious extreme over against illicit indulgence, with moderation in the shape of the holy state of matrimony occupying the mean. However, as we have said, men may lawfully sacrifice some degree of the material good of bodily health for the sake of another material good, bodily pleasure.

It follows, as bearing on the morality of the subject, that the manufacture and the selling of alcoholic liquors are lawful trades. No exception can be taken to the brewer or the publican as such on moral grounds. Provided their business is conducted justly, the liquor sold is what it professes to be, the price fair, and no inducements to excess held out, they have as much right to pursue their trade as the grocer or the tobacconist or the haberdasher. They are engaged in supplying a demand which demand is in itself legitimate. The denunciations we hear of breweries and distilleries arise from their over-production and the exorbitant profits connected with them. The outcry against the public-house in the British Isles and the saloon in America is largely inspired by the malpractices often connected with the conduct of such establishments, and their unhealthy character in themselves. But there is no need of their being either ill-conducted or unhealthy.

THE SALOON AS A TEMPTATION

There remains a further matter bearing on the ethics of the drink question, viz., the morality of multiplying facilities for indulgence. It should hardly be necessary to state what psychology, common-sense and experience combine to emphasize, i. e., that, *ceteris paribus*, the more frequent the temptation the greater the risk of falling, and therefore the greater facilities offered for getting drunk the more drunkenness will result. Yet reduction of the number of public-houses has been opposed on the strange ground, supposed to be exemplified by statistics, that the fewer the public-houses the greater the amount of drunkenness! It is certainly the fact that there are districts of England with few public-houses which greatly exceed in the number of convictions for drunkenness those where public-houses abound—hence the wild deduction that restriction breeds excess. No better instance could be found to illustrate the unwisdom of re-

lying on statistics alone. For, apart from the uncertainty introduced into this case by diversity of police practice, it happens that those sparsely-provided districts uniformly comprise mining, industrial, and seaport towns, where indulgence in excess is naturally much more common. Consequently the fewness of public-houses there is a direct result of the vigorous efforts of the justices to keep the prevalent excess within as close limits as possible. The prevalent drunkenness, in other words, is occupational, not local. Of course no moralist denies that restriction pushed to an extreme and *unsupported by popular opinion*, has a tendency to produce worse evils than those it aims at suppressing, and therefore prudent schemes of temperance reform must always take into account the tastes and dispositions of the people for whom they are framed. . . .

THE TRUE MOTIVES FOR TEMPERANCE

This introduces the last element of our discussion of the moral aspects of the drink question. Intemperance less or greater is, like avarice and lust, essentially a moral evil, and calls for moral remedies. In the alcoholized subject an animal craving, which cannot even be called natural, since mere beasts do not ordinarily follow their appetites to their own destruction, has in this one point broken down the control of reason: the damage is in the spiritual part, and it is there that it must be repaired. Physical remedies, the removal of temptation, the arousing of other interests, are very useful and may be even necessary as helpful conditions, but of themselves they will never restore lost will-tissues. Consequently, as we have seen in our sketch of Catholic temperance organizations, the Church insists on such societies being mainly religious, membership being confined to practising Catholics, and other objects, such as sick-benefit, life-insurance, etc., being secondary. She holds out total abstinence as practically necessary for the victims of drink and as highly expedient for the spiritual welfare of the self-controlled and self-sacrificing. And, as long as these motives are prominent, we may trust that the temperance movement will grow in strength and influence. Utilitarian motives, of course, abound. A prudent self-regard may prompt abstinence from what does not bene-

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THE TRUE MOTIVES FOR TEMPERANCE

This introduces the last element of our discussion of the moral aspects of the drink question. Intemperance less or greater is, like avarice and lust, essentially a moral evil, and calls for moral remedies. In the alcoholized subject an animal craving, which cannot even be called natural, since mere beasts do not ordinarily follow their appetites to their own destruction, has in this one point broken down the control of reason: the damage is in the spiritual part, and it is there that it must be repaired. Physical remedies, the removal of temptation, the arousing of other interests, are very useful and may be even necessary as helpful conditions, but of themselves they will never restore lost will-tissues. Consequently, as we have seen in our sketch of Catholic temperance organizations, the Church insists on such societies being mainly religious, membership being confined to practising Catholics, and other objects, such as sick-benefit, life-insurance, etc., being secondary. She holds out total abstinence as practically necessary for the victims of drink and as highly expedient for the spiritual welfare of the self-controlled and self-sacrificing. And, as long as these motives are prominent, we may trust that the temperance movement will grow in strength and influence. Utilitarian motives, of course, abound. A prudent self-regard may prompt abstinence from what does not bene-

fit and may easily injure health, what is a source of considerable expense bringing in no adequate return, what experience has shown leads to loss of will-power and mental energy. Enlightened patriotism may suggest personal withdrawal from the encouragement of what, *de facto*, is a grave social evil. The premium set on temperance by many prudent employers may influence a man whose strength and integrity form a useful asset. But these are not the supernatural motives which make total abstinence an act of virtue. The desire to atone for past excess, or to offer reparation for the excess of others, or to encourage those who are in the grip of a bad habit, or simply to assert command over an appetite apt to rebel—these, on the contrary, all involve the interests of Almighty God more or less explicitly and ennoble the conduct that they inspire. Much more does the purpose to imitate the Man of Sorrows, by denying oneself permanently for the love of Him what ranks as one of the pleasures of life, elevate total abstinence to the level of virtue, and associate the abstainer in some degree with those who have left all to follow Christ. Motives such as these, combined with the sense that God who inspires them must also enable them to be duly fulfilled, serve to keep total abstinence from being merely one form of refined selfishness or a pharisaic assumption of superior virtue. They make an appeal to generosity and unselfishness: at the same time, they depend upon the practice both of humility and confidence.

Prohibition and Alcoholism

MICHAEL KENNY, S.J.

SOME years ago Father Julian Johnston wrote in the *Ecclesiastical Review*: "I make this prediction, that at no very distant date Protestant bigotry will recognize in Prohibition a means of prohibiting the Mass." We have seen his prediction verified. Heathen, Moslem and heretic everywhere converged on the Mass the multiple ingenuities of their war on Catholicism and our colonies followed their example. But at the birth of the

United States the Mass came forth as by miracle from its hiding places to be offered continuously to His Name, from the rising to the setting of our sun, under the labarum of liberty. Bigots, impelled by fanatic ignorance or Masonic "enlightenment," attacked it at times as by demoniac instinct, but the free spirit of our laws and people rendered open assault hopeless of success. Then commenced a flanking movement which would seem to be the cleverest maneuver ever engineered by the enemies of Christ. Hosts were enrolled for Prohibition who would never have rallied for persecution; Methodist and Baptist bigotry soon voiced their recognition of its potent aid; Masonry, which was cradled in a tavern and prescribed spirits for its meetings, often notoriously exceeding the prescription, suddenly discovered the new "light" that "Alcohol is the Outlaw" (*New Age*, February, 1918); and so the movement waxed towards the climax when lo! it would eliminate the Mass automatically by the insidious implication of a phrase.

This implication lurks also in the National Amendment. Catholics know by faith that what the priest consumes in the sacrificial act of the Mass is no longer wine; but to the vast majority who have not this faith it is a "beverage." Surely the devil is not stupid if, despairing of destroying God, he would destroy God's image in man's soul, and in aid thereto cut off His greatest economy of grace, the life of the soul, by preventing God's physical presence in the Eucharist. It is not likely that the Supreme Court will hold valid a law prohibitive of a worship coeval with Christianity and practised freely in this land from our birth as a nation, a law that over a sixth of our population and a third of our armed defenders should in conscience repudiate, and the likelihood is lessened by the influence of the Oklahoma decision on State and Federal interpretation.

PROHIBITING MASS WINE

But even when sacramental wine is declared exempt of Prohibition laws, an insidious influence remains. Christ constituted wine a necessary element to continue His Atonement and perpetuate His physical presence among men. To many, if not most, absolute Prohibition carries the implication that this alcoholic element is an

odious and evil thing, stamped as such by national reprobation. But such an element,, banned and accursed of the nation, is precisely that which Catholics select for their most sacred rite of adoration. The further reaches of this logic may spell wrath and hate and persecution. Hence, were sacramental wine made safe, the fight would not be over. It were wise to forestall it now by preventive measures, that is, by combating Prohibition in itself and in its causes. Not only as a menace to the Mass, but as an easy avenue to the tyranny of governmental interference in whatsoever private and personal activity, Prohibition is itself far more dangerous than the multiple evils it aims to eradicate. But these are real evils. As Catholics and citizens we should be the first to give them battle; and we have been remiss. If, at the time and in the spirit of the Third Baltimore Council, we had established a constructive citizen movement to eliminate, by legal enactment and enlightened public opinion, those abuses of alcohol which make Prohibition's program plausible, it would not now be threatening to undermine the fabric of our religious and civil liberties. Even now such action should prove a healthy and helpful influence.

Prohibition is no preventive. It has already multiplied the making and distribution of bad whiskies, and of drugs, as alcoholic and more poisonous, and therewith the immorality and contempt of authority that such practices are wont to beget. "Throw nature out through the door, 'twill come back through the window"; and always worse than it went. But even were Prohibition a preventive it would have to be rejected on the triple ground, that it is a religious, a scientific, and a constitutional heresy. Prohibition's fundamental doctrines are: (1) That alcohol is necessarily evil, in itself, or in its effect, or in both; (2) That it is always physically injurious, or, at least, never beneficial; (3) That the State has the right to invade hearth and home and every avenue of liberty to prevent the making and taking of alcoholic beverages. These doctrines are false.

The use of wine is frequently commended, and is sacrificially commanded, in the Old Testament, and its abuse only, as St. Epiphanius wrote against the Encratites, is condemned. The New Testament enlarges the

commendation. Christ our Lord not only made wine essential to His perpetual Sacrifice, not only miraculously provided "good wine" for a wedding feast, but He drank Himself of the wine presented Him, and He condemned equally both pharasaical extremes on the liquor question: "John the Baptist came neither eating bread nor drinking wine, and you say: he hath a devil. The Son of Man is come eating and drinking, and you say: behold a man who is a glutton and a drinker of wine, a friend of publicans and sinners." Hence, the Church, which condemns intemperance as a vice, has branded the teaching of the Encratites and Manicheans, that wine is inherently evil, as a heresy. St. John Chrysostom, as is his wont, speaks as pertinently to the twentieth century as to the fourth:

I hear many cry when these deplorable excesses happen: "Would there were no wine!" Folly and madness! When other men sin you find fault with the gifts of God. What an insanity is this! Is it the wine that causes this abuse? No, it is not the wine, but the intemperance of those who take an evil delight in it. Cry rather, "Would to God there were no drunkenness, no luxury"; but if you shout, "Would there were no wine," you should add, "Would there were no iron," because of the murderers; "Would there were no night," because of the thieves; "Would there were no light," because of the informers; "Would there were no women," because of adulteries. In this way you might destroy everything. . . . This, he continues, is a satanical mode of reasoning.

and having shown that wine is given to produce joy and health and to remedy disease, he adds: "God honors you with the gift; why do you dishonor yourself with the excess thereof?"

PROHIBITION A SCIENTIFIC HERESY

From the teachings of the Scriptures and the Church on the use and abuse of alcoholic beverages, it follows that Prohibition is also a scientific heresy, for truths of religion and science, emanating from the same source, cannot be contradictory. The last word of medical science is quite in harmony with St. John Chrysostom. Prohibitionists in Great Britain, as with us, were first in the field with their favorite prescription "to win the war"; but the expert Committee appointed to examine the question, reported that the moderate use of alcoholic beverages should be permitted and provided to workers and fighters, precisely in order "to win the war." So it

was ordered. This policy was strengthened by the great medical authority of St. James Crichton-Browne, who, in a monograph remarkable for literary charm as well as scientific value, reviews with admirable poise the good and evil, moral and physiological, resulting from the past and present use and abuse of alcohol. He shows that the chemists who denied Liebig's assertion of the food value of alcohol were deceived by faulty experiments, that modern research has proved that alcohol "is undoubtedly a genuine food," and there are good physiological grounds "for the universal employment of fermented beverages," and that these have important alimentary and medicinal value. Used moderately and proportionately to needs, alcoholic beverages, he insists, promote digestion and assimilation, supplement defective diets, quicken recuperation of the sick and physically exhausted, and are "so eminently useful" in combating disease and for general therapeutic purposes that "almost every practitioner finds it to be of value in his particular department" and "most sober-minded medical men today . . . admit they would feel lost, lamed and impotent if deprived of its use." Noting that all progressive races have been consumers of alcohol and the only races that abandoned it, the Moslems, fell into intellectual stagnation; that nature which provides the appetite has been most liberal in diverse means of supplying it; that alcohol has proved a liberator of energy, a stimulant to individuality, a lubricant for the friction and an anodyne for the miseries of life, he concludes that its judicious use has been beneficial intellectually in stimulating the brain, and morally in developing the will power requisite to select and reject judiciously. While keenly alive to the dangerous evils of its abuse, he is at one with Lord Lister, Gautier, Sir James Paget and other eminent medical scientists, that,

Alcohol has . . . an enormous balance of good to its credit. It has thrown down; but it has built up on a far larger scale. It is somehow bound up with human destiny. It has been abused and subjected to abuse as if it were possessed by a devil; but it still holds its own, and in a multiplicity of ways ministers to the well-being and happiness of mankind. Our aim should be to avail ourselves of the gracious services it offers and to prevent its prostitution.

The British authority has this to say of Prohibition's constitutional aspect:

The acquirement of self-control is one of the main objects of education, the exercise of it a chief part in the discipline of life; and to substitute for it grandmotherly legislation is to debilitate human nature and court disaster. There is no danger to a lawful government greater than for a well-behaved subject to feel himself deprived of his natural rights.

This danger is aggravated when the good citizen is deprived also of his constitutional rights, and threatened with further usurpation. Our Government has specially emphasized the principle that men should be free to go their own way so long as they trespass not on others' rights. This freedom has been constitutionally secured to each State in the control of its domestic affairs, and custom has extended it in degree to county, city and township. Prohibition would wrest this control in purely domestic concerns, not only from the local bodies in the State, but from the State itself, adding to the national Government's supremacy in interstate relations, supremacy also in the State's own internal affairs; and not in liquor questions only, but in all. Give to a government of centralizing tendencies and multiplying bureaucratic facilities the power to regulate one of the matters within State jurisdiction, and you give it a foothold for regulating all. You are abdicating democracy for absolutism. Moreover, the State is, in effect, usurping the rights of other States while relinquishing its own. Mississippi and Florida or some sectional group may dictate habits and conduct to Illinois and New York, and vice-versa. "Majority rule" may alienate inalienable rights, and there is no knowing what conduct its unreasoning advocates will next assail. In fact, that section, which once with its blood championed State rights to prevent the freedom of many, is now foremost in renouncing State rights to diminish the freedom of all. Central control of the States' domestic affairs is a far-reaching constitutional heresy, the most perilous to the nation's destiny of the three heresies which Prohibition embodies.

THE ABUSE OF STRONG DRINK

But the State has the right and duty to eliminate those elements which are directly promotive of public disorder, in so far as they so promote it. Drunkenness, with its concomitant and resultant evils, is notoriously such a disorder; but not all alcoholic beverages tend of their nature to produce it. The main cause of drunkenness, as

the British experts reported, is not beers nor pure wines, but the abuse of strong drink or distilled spirits. The natural distinction between the two classes should be noted. Beers and natural wines have a positive food value, and their use constitutes no proximate menace to public order; spirits do constitute such a menace, and their food value is indirect and mainly medicinal. These Government should rigidly control in manufacture and distribution, and entrust their direction to medical and scientific experts.

The manufacture should be regulated even more carefully than the distribution. Most of the bourbons, ryes, etc., advertised as "pure" are dangerously impure, containing much fusel oil and other poisonous by-products of fermentation. It is these, and not pure ethyl alcohol, which usually create the alcoholic appetite that makes inebriates. Government should see that these toxic poisons be absolutely eliminated in distillation and rectification. It should also suppress the general practice of manipulating wines with alcohol and injurious chemicals, which make the product not wine but an alcoholic stimulant; and it should extend its watchfulness to the patent medicines, scores of which contain more alcohol than spirits and strong wines, are more poisonous than the common whiskies, and through drug store and mail order are more extensively distributed than either.

The distribution of pure wines and beers should be in proportion to population and entrusted to reputable men, who should be under bond to provide no liquors to minors or inebriates, to permit no indecencies of act or word, to close on Sundays and observe the hours and other reasonable restrictions prescribed. Under such conditions the liquor traffic would bring no disgrace on those engaged in it.

A sound public opinion is a prerequisite for such a reformation, and in forming it Catholics must take a leading part. Protestantism in swaying from one extreme to another has lost the sense of proportion, of comparative moral values, of the distinction between use and abuse. Catholics, who know, with the philosophy of Catholic truth, that temperance and abstinence are begotten of the will, not of external compulsion; that the will should follow the findings of the intellect and be

trained in home and school and church to find and follow wisely; and that the command to pluck out your own scandalizing eye never warrants your plucking out the eye of your scandalizing neighbor, should seize on every avenue of intelligence to instruct their less-favored fellow-citizens on the true moral basis of civic rights, duties and forbearances. We should teach them that alcohol if thrown out through the door of Prohibition will return in a more vicious form through the windows of illicit stills and drinking dens and drugs. We would do well to circulate such balanced studies as Father Johnston's "An Aspect of Prohibition," Crichton-Browne's "What We Owe to Alcohol," Martin's "Fallacy of Prohibition," De Focatiis' "Main Source of Alcoholism," Rev. Dr. Wasson's "Religion and Drink," and Hon. Royal Cabell and ex-Senator Bailey's addresses, which cover the religious, scientific and constitutional phases of the question.

But our best propaganda will be our own example. If as Catholics we practise ourselves and form in our children and dependents that self-control which begets temperance and abstinence in liquors as in other subjects of indulgence; and if as citizens we bring an enlightened conscience into politics and business, and thereby enact good laws and see that they are kept, such emotional extravagances as Prohibition will soon settle into sense. In the United States Constitution we are heirs to the wisest instrument of government that obtains in any great nation of our day. It devolves most on Catholics to preserve it in the sense and spirit of its founders. If we maintain this heritage, it will of itself preserve all our liberties.

Personal Prohibition Needed

W. J. LOCKINGTON, S.J.,

From a Pamphlet Published by the Australian Catholic Truth Society, in 1915.

A problem that is the subject of much thought at the present time in the minds of earnest workers for humanity is that of discovering the most efficacious means of checking the evil of drink. This is an evil that is creep-

ing like a plague through our civilization, leaving ruin and desolation in its track. It is the great problem of the present day. Matters relating to health, housing, labor, poverty, crime, and charity are troubling most nations. The question of drink is interwoven with them all, and overshadows them all.

Everywhere the awful results of the curse where it touches the individual soul, or taints family and national life, are, alas! only too evident. In the Old World the patriotic Englishman hears each year the tramp of an army that marches by, a doomed host, 60,000 strong, staggering to its goal, the dishonored blackness of a drunkard's grave. In the ranks he sees old age, despicable and degraded, manhood and womanhood trampled in the mire, childhood with the lilies of its innocence faded. His countrymen spend £500,000 each day in strong drink. In the New World, in the United States of America, the American that is anxious for the welfare of his country finds that a great part of his national trouble comes from the fact that his compatriots spend \$1,568,470,514 yearly in drink.

On every side earnest workers, animated by love of God and love of their fellow-men, are strenuously striving to check the terrible tide. The crying urgency of the evil, and its magnitude, impel them to throw themselves into the fight with impetuous ardor. This very eagerness and earnestness, however, are very dangerous assets if they be not steadied by scientific knowledge of the evil to be attacked. Zeal without knowledge is like a galloping four-in-hand without a guiding arm on the reins; progress is rapid while the road is straight and clear, but the very first turn or team met will inevitably bring disaster. Study of the subject has, as was to be expected, brought forth many different opinions and many proposed remedies. Of these, only one concerns us here, that which is popularly, or unpopularly, as the case may be, known as Prohibition.

CARDINAL GIBBONS SPEAKS

In the year 1914, for declaring that "Prohibition was impossible in a Christian country," Cardinal Gibbons was severely criticized. Let us examine the system in operation, and judge it by its results. The Prohibition move-

ment arose from the fact that many, in looking for causes in order to apply efficient remedies, have concluded that the root of the evil is the existence of the ubiquitous saloon. Watching the crowds that flock to these places and spend their hours uselessly and injuriously, they cry: "Let us close these houses, and banish strong drink from the land, and we shall be a sober people!" It seems a rational and commendable course. There is an imperative command laid upon man by God of avoiding the occasions of evil. The saloon is an occasion of evil to many, and therefore must be avoided by them. Just imagine the plight of a poor workingman, with a weakness for drink, who, to return home, has to pass through the streets of one of the great cities of today with its saloon on almost every street-corner! If he is to obey that command, his only safe mode of progression would be by balloon; and even then the probability of his striking a saloon in descending would be very great.

Prohibitionists argue that if these houses be removed from our streets, the cause of the temptation being banished, men could walk to their work and to their homes sober and respectable citizens. So convinced are they of the truth of this that they have begun, and are carrying on, a vigorous propaganda by voice and pen, and argue that it is the duty of the State to act as they wish in this vitally important matter. In some places they have succeeded in this; they have had the sale of strong drink forbidden in certain areas, under pain of very severe penalties.

The innumerable pamphlets and leaflets that its supporters scatter broadcast all aim at proving that Prohibition turns the land where it obtains into a paradise in which man lives happy and contented. Workmen are said to be better paid, employers better served, families better cared for. One lecturer says: "It is effective alike in town and country districts; it has reduced crime and poverty; it has saved material wealth; above all, it means the 'permanent saving of young men for good citizenship.'" Unfortunately, time as it passes reveals that the leaven of Prohibition does not act on society in the beneficent way its supporters proclaim.

PROHIBITION IN MAINE

Let us study, for a few moments, the condition of things in the State of Maine, the first State in America to adopt Prohibition. Here we have a State where it has been in operation for nearly seventy years, and where all the conditions that, humanly speaking, make for success were present. The agitation there began soon after the year 1830. General Neal Dow was one of the leaders. He was instrumental in passing the first law prohibiting drink, in the year 1846. Since that year, with the exception of two years, Maine has been a Prohibition State. Time after time the law has been amended and elaborated in order to render it more effectual. A highly-organized body of police and sheriffs and deputies saw to the carrying out of the law, and a scale of very heavy penalties, by fines and imprisonment, was passed by the Legislature to ensure its observance.

About a year ago an article appeared in an Irish paper, written by a gentleman who had visited Portland, the chief city of Maine. He was highly pleased with all he saw there, and wrote advising the Irish people that, if they wished to grapple with the drink problem, they could not do better than follow the example of Maine. Her laws were extolled, and her methods of enforcing them. Then followed a roseate account of Portland—no saloon, no drinking, no drunken men, and a contented, prosperous community. Reading it, one would incline to the belief that Prohibition was a panacea for all civic ills.

It happened that during the same year, and in the same month of the year, in which this gentleman was in Portland I was there also. I had gone to Maine to see, personally, the effects produced in a State where Prohibition had been the law for nearly three-quarters of a century. I am sorry to be compelled to state that my experiences were not such as would cause me to agree with the opinions of the writer spoken of. True, to the casual observer the streets seemed orderly and the saloon entirely absent. But when I penetrated beneath this external respectability, as I was enabled to do by the credentials I had obtained, I found that things were not what they seemed. Space will not permit of a detailed account of my investigations, else I might tell of

the many scenes of wretched misery, of vice and poverty, all reeking with drink. I found drinking rampant in every direction, and drinking accompanied by all the evils that attend "sly-grog" selling.

"SAND-PEEPS" EVERYWHERE

In those quiet-seeming streets were numbers of women and young girls, with small bottles of liquor concealed about their persons, ready to supply whoever asked. These bottles are known locally as "sand-peeps," because so many of them are to be seen every morning lying empty, half-hidden in the sand of the roadside. What I saw in Portland convinced me that the action of him who would cure the drink evil by Prohibition is like to that of a father who, finding his child mottled with the red rash of fever, places the boy under a cold shower bath. The red rash disappears, and the father, looking on the fair, white skin, is jubilant, because, in his ignorance, he thinks that he has cured his child. It does not need a medical expert to tell him that he has but driven the disease inwards, where it will strike at the very vitals of the child; and, unless prompt measures be taken, that father will soon be arranging matters with the undertaker. Likewise in Portland, the disease has been driven beneath the surface, and runs riot there unchecked. It is eating into the very vitals. "Kitchen bar-rooms" by the score abound, each with its own circle of customers, degrading the families that own them. Portland is a standing example of the washing of the outside of the platter. I shall tabulate a few facts to substantiate these statements:

(1) The report of the Probation Officer for Portland for the year ending December 31, 1910, shows that in his court the number of people arrested was 989. Of this number, 874 were arrested for drunkenness. (2) The report of the Sheriff for the same year tells of 2311 commitments for drunkenness. (3) The report of the Chief of Police for the same year tabulates the fact that, out of 4793 arrests, 3437 were for drunkenness.

Comment on such astounding facts were superfluous. In the year 1908 the police raided a "rum express" company's offices in Portland. I do not know how many employees the company had, but I subjoin the list of delivery from April 4 to May 8, 1908, of *one* of them:

137 kegs of intoxicating liquor, weighing 100 lbs. each..	13,700 lb.
13 cases of intoxicating liquor, weighing 110 lbs. each..	1,430 lb.
74 cases of intoxicating liquor, weighing 55 lbs. each..	4,070 lb.
41 jugs of intoxicating liquor, weighing 16 lbs. each..	656 lb.
7 jugs of intoxicating liquor, weighing 10 lbs. each..	70 lb.
1 bottle of intoxicating liquor, weighing 85 lbs.....	85 lb.
Total	20,011 lb.

VIGILANCE OF THE AUTHORITIES

Truly, an amazing record for one employee of one company for one month! An obvious question suggests itself here as to whether the authorities do their duty and endeavor to enforce the law. These authorities are divided into three distinct departments, namely, the deputy enforcement commission, the police, and the deputy sheriffs.

In answer, I may state that I have examined cards of commitment that are kept by the Sheriff's liquor-seizing squad for the use of the prosecuting attorney in the Grand Jury hearing. The cards, for instance, bearing dates between January 10 and April 29, 1910, show that during that time there were 111 seizures, or more than one seizure a day. Yet these officers were blamed for neglect, and at the election held in the following September were put out of office, an action that showed that, in cases of neglect of duty, the offenders were severely punished, and steps taken to ensure enforcement of the law. Another proof of the vigilance of the authorities is the list of fines imposed. This is astonishingly long, and shows the uselessness of Prohibition to check the sale of liquor. Here are a few of the fines, copied at random: A paid in fines from May, 1904, to September, 1908, \$1,900; B paid from January, 1906, to January, 1909, \$900; C paid from January, 1906, to January, 1909, \$1,700; D paid from January, 1906, to May, 1908, \$900. One married couple paid in thirteen years the sum of \$12,000 in fines.

OPINION OF A PORTLAND PAPER

A summary of the condition of Maine in 1908 was given by the *Daily Express Argus* of Portland in its issue of March 21 of that year. It was written on the occasion of the birthday anniversary of General Neal Dow, "the Father" of the movement, and is as follows:

The birthday anniversary yesterday of Neal Dow suggests a reference to the movement with which that name has become so closely identified. Aroused to the evils incident to the liquor traffic, Neal Dow set himself to the work of extirpating them with all the energy of a resolute will. His method was the short-sighted one of compulsion. He proposed to prohibit the liquor traffic altogether, regardless of the public sentiment in any individual community; to make men sober and total abstainers by law. The system which he so strenuously advocated finally prevailed in Maine, and was later adopted by some fourteen or fifteen other States.

What have been the net results? In the first place, the resort to legal compulsion weakened, and at last practically ended, the efforts which, like the Washingtonian movement, depended on persuasion, the appeal to reason, to moral and to common-sense. This has been an incalculable injury to the cause of genuine temperance. The resentment and opposition engendered by sumptuary legislation of this type have also hurt the temperance cause.

In other directions the imposition of Prohibition has been fruitful in evils, as bad as, if not worse than, drunkenness. It has fostered a spirit of lawlessness and law-evasion. It has promoted hypocrisy and humbug and the "gentle art of lying." It has proved a fertile source of corruption in politics, and of moral debauchery in public officials. Maine people, conversant with conditions under Prohibition in this State, know that these are facts. After over half a century of Prohibition experience, what has Maine to show for Neal Dow's system? A record of humbug and law evasion, varied only by spasms of enforcement, inspired mainly by fear or pretence; the introduction of vile liquor, in the sale and distribution of which even women and children have been impressed, and a degree of drunkenness that compares with many licence communities. After more than half a century of Prohibition, for instance, the arrests for drunkenness in a year in a single Maine city of 20,000 numbered over 2500, the highest in the city's history.

The above is certainly a stringent criticism, and even after making allowance for the warmth of partisanship, is a terrible indictment of Prohibition.

EX-PRESIDENT TAFT SPEAKS

I shall bring one other witness, an eminent jurist, far removed from partisanship, Mr. William H. Taft, formerly President of the United States of America. In his work, "Four Aspects of Civic Duty," in the chapter on "The Duties of Citizens Viewed from the Standpoint of a Judge on the Bench," Mr. Taft writes as follows:

Nothing is more foolish, nothing more utterly at variance with a sound public policy, than to enact a law which, by reason of the conditions surrounding the community in which it is

declared to be law, is incapable of enforcement. Such an instance is sometimes presented by sumptuary laws, by which the sale of intoxicating liquors is prohibited under penalty, in localities where the public sentiment of the immediate community does not, and will not, sustain the enforcement of the law. In such cases the legislation is usually the result of agitation by people in the country who are determined to make their fellow-citizens in the city better.

The enactment of the law comes through the country representatives, who form a majority of the Legislature; but the enforcement of the law is among the people who are generally opposed to its enactment, and under such circumstances the law is a dead letter. This result is the great argument in favor of so-called local option, which is really an instrumentality for determining whether a law can be enforced before it is made operative. In cases where the sale of liquor cannot be prohibited in fact, it is far better to regulate and diminish the evil than to attempt to stamp it out. By the enactment of a drastic law and the failure to enforce it there is injected into the public mind the idea that laws are to be observed or violated according to the will of those affected. I need not say how altogether pernicious such a loose theory is. General Grant said the way to secure the repeal of a bad law was to enforce it. But when the part of the community which enacts the law is not the part affected by its enforcement, this is not a practicable method. The constant violation or neglect of any law leads to a demoralized view of all laws, and the choice of the laws to be enforced then becomes as uncertain as the guess of a political executive in respect to public opinion is likely to make it. Such a policy constantly enlarges in the community and the class of men with whom the sacredness of law does not exist.

Here we have the testimony of one of the most eminent jurists of America, a man who, by reason of his integrity and his learning, has been elected to the highest office in the land of his birth, and who is today President of the Academy of Jurisprudence in America. He speaks with the judgment of a long experience, filled with exceptional opportunities, and gives with judicial dispassionateness his reasons for stating that Prohibition is a failure, thereby justifying and agreeing with the opinion of that eminent churchman, Cardinal Gibbons, who crystallizes all the legal arguments of ex-President Taft in the one sentence, "Prohibition is impossible in a Christian country."